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Abstract 
The Internet-based market is rising as a viable 
venue for the procurement of innovation solutions. 
There are two major procurement mechanisms 
existing in the market practices: contest and RFP. 
We investigate the factors that affect a firm’s 
preference of one mechanism over the other. We 
divide innovation problems into two categories: 
exploitive innovation problem and exploratory 
innovation problem. For an exploitive innovation 
problem, technologies used in solutions already 
exist, and the outcome of the solution is determined 
by the type and the effort of a solver. For an 
exploratory problem, technologies are not available; 
solvers need to go through an exploratory process 
but the result of his effort is uncertain. We establish 
the boundary condition for solution seeker’s 
decision on procurement mechanism. For an 
exploitive innovation problem, RFP is preferred in 
an open-participation market unless the distribution 
of the solvers’ type has a big variance; for an 
explorative innovation problem, contest will be 
preferred in most cases except that the solver pool 
of the market is small. Moreover, the amount of a 
cash award, the effort coefficient, and the degree of 
the randomness endowed in a technology 
exploratory process all have effect on seekers’ 
decision. 
 
Keywords: Internet-based innovation markets, 
contest, RFP, open innovation  
 
Introduction 
In a world of the distributed knowledge, firms and 
institutions need to leverage outsiders’ wisdom to 
solve their own innovation problems. Instead of 
solving the problem completely in-house, they have 
begun to either work with outside partners or 
procure solutions from market. This movement is 
termed as open innovation by Chesbrough (2002). 
With the involvement of the Internet, the open 
innovation has grown more open to participants 
and to various scopes, because the Internet not only 
creates a viable environment for innovators to 
communicate and collaborate with each other but 
also incubates a variety of markets to embrace all 
sorts of innovation problems.  
Some procurement markets for innovation 
have emerged in recent years. InnoCentive, as one 
of the best-known online innovation markets, takes 
up innovation problems in a broad range of domain 
such as computer science, chemistry, physical 
sciences, life sciences, etc. The problems that come 
from the “seekers” who are either companies, or 
non-profit organizations or public sectors are 
opened up to the “solvers” who are scientists, 
researchers or innovators. As of 2008 InnoCentive 
had 64 of these seekers posting more than 800 
problems in 40 disciplines. More than 300 of them 
have already been solved by over 165,000 solvers.1 
Contest is the main transaction mechanism used in 
InnoCentive, in which the solver with the best 
solution wins cash award. Another transaction 
mechanism is RFP (known as eRFP in InnoCentive) 
which allows a seeker to submit a Request for 
Proposal to the solver’s community. After a number 
of solvers turn in RFP responses, the seeker will 
select the best RFP response by his evaluation and 
contact its submitter for further development.  
Contest and RFP are the most common 
mechanisms for innovation procurement. Some 
markets apply both of them (e.g. InnoCentive), 
while others adopt only one (e.g. Innovation 
Exchange uses Contest and NineSigma uses eRFP).  
Specifically, contests used in these markets are 
tournaments that reward the provider of the best 
solution on a specific date. In the tournament, a 
solution is pre-prepared by a solver. If it does not 
rise as the best solution, all the costs spent on the 
solution will be sunk. In contrast, RFP eliminates 
the sunk costs by choosing proposals rather than 
fully completed solutions. The provider of the best 
proposals will be rewarded with a contract to 
develop his proposal into a solution. Although to 
prepare proposals generates cost, it is much less 
costing than the full development of a solution.  
Economists have long believed that 
innovation is uncontractable because its inputs are 
unobservable and its outcomes can hardly be 
verified by a court. Though, the adoption of RFP by 
real innovation markets reveals that at least some 
of the innovations can be contracted, and under 
certain circumstances, RFP works better than 
contest as an innovation procurement mechanism. 
However, it is unclear in which types of 
innovations and under what circumstances RFP 
                                                 
1 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InnoCentive 
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outperforms contest or vice versa. Our paper aims 
to address those questions. 
In our paper, we view innovation as a 
process of searching over some poorly understood 
knowledge landscape (Simon and Newell 1962; 
Levinthal 1997). We divide the unknown landscape 
into two areas. One is associated with not knowing 
who the best solver of a problem is; the other is 
associated with missing technologies to solve 
problems. We define the problems in the former 
area as exploitive innovation problems and in the 
latter as exploratory innovation problems. For an 
exploitive innovation problem, technologies are 
ready. The objective of seekers is to find the right 
solver who makes the best use of the technologies. 
For an exploratory innovation, in contrast, 
technologies do not exist yet and the seekers must 
drive solvers to invent them. The quality of the 
final solutions for both problems is characterized 
with uncertainty. The uncertainty in exploitive 
problems is related to the endowed characteristics 
of solvers; while the uncertainty in exploratory 
problems mainly lies in the random results of 
inventions.  
Let us take a real case as an example. The 
Oil Recovery Institute needed to find a new and 
novel way to get oil of the bottom of the ocean near 
Alaska. They could get the oil off the bottom and 
onto the barges, but the surface temperature drops 
so dramatically that the oil solidifies and cannot be 
pumped through the barge system. The solver 
ended up being an engineer who solved that 
problem using a common technology in the 
construction industry. He recognized that problem 
was very similar to the problem of keeping cement 
liquid while people pouring a foundation. Thus, he 
suggested the Institute to use vibrating equipment 
on the barges to keep the oil fluid enough. In this 
case, the technology is already available, and the 
winner is who recognized it. Therefore, we 
categorize this problem as an exploitive innovation 
problem. For another instance, the Prize4Life 
foundation featured a $1 million award for finding 
a biomarker that measures ALS disease progression, 
in which case the technology was not unavailable 
and solvers needed to invent it. Therefore, from our 
perspective, it is an exploratory innovation 
problem. 
In our paper, we model two types of 
innovation problems and study each problem of 
under which conditions a seeker will prefer to RFP 
or vice versa. We find that in an exploitive 
innovation problem, a seeker’s decision is affected 
by both the size and the diversity of the solver pool 
in the market, and also that the value of the 
problem which is presented by the amount of cash 
awards influences seekers’ preference to a 
mechanism. In an exploratory innovation problem, 
the main influential factor is the number of solvers 
and the randomness of the exploratory process. The 
trade-off behind the choice between contest and 
RFP is related to the advantage and the side-effect a 
contest has in a given setting. When the advantages 
overwhelm the side-effects, contest is preferred, 
otherwise, RFP wins out.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. We first review the relevant literature, then 
develop the models and establish our main results. 
Finally, we conclude the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
There is a set of papers focusing on the optimal 
tournament design in R&D settings (e.g., [2] [4] [5] 
[8] [11]). All of these papers find that allowing 
open participation in tournaments mitigate 
sponsors’ profits, because the fierce competition 
between solvers causes their underinvestment in 
effort. To reduce this inefficiency, Taylor (1995) 
suggests sponsors restricting participation by taxing 
contestants through an entry fee [11]; Fullerton and 
McAfee (1999) demonstrate that an all-pay auction 
for the entry fee is efficient to select the most 
qualified contestants for competition [4]; Fullerton 
et al. (2002) shows that conducting auctions at the 
end of research tournaments will generally reduce 
the sponsor's prize expenditure relative to 
fixed-prize tournaments [5]. However, Terwiesch 
and Xu (2008) have an arguing result. They 
analyze three types of innovation project: a) 
expertise-based project, b) ideation project and c) 
trial-and-error project, and demonstrate that for all 
the types of innovation, the seeker can benefit from 
open-participation contest “because he can obtain a 
more diverse set of solutions, which mitigates and 
sometimes outweighs the effect of the solvers’ 
underinvestment in effort” [12]. Unlike this stream 
of literature, our paper not only discusses the effect 
of the number of participants on seekers’ profit but 
also provides a new insight into the effect of the 
distribution characteristics of participants. 
Moreover, Terwiesch and Xu (2008) 
compared the quality of the solutions and the 
seekers’ profits in a contest and in an internal 
innovation. They suggested that the benefit of 
contest is enabling seekers to find solvers with low 
effort cost, while the ineffiency of contest is 
causing the underinvestment in the solvers’ effort. 
They further demonstrated if the external solver’s 
effort cost is lower than certain level, open contest 
is a better choice than internal innovation. On and 
beyond Terwiesch and Xu (2008), our paper 
concerns seekers’ choice between two procurement 
mechanisms: contest and RFP. Assuming that 
seekers are able to find solvers at the same effort 
cost in these two mechanisms, to reach the low cost 
solver is no longer the only benefit out of contest. 
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Thus, the reason behind a choice decision on 
contest or RFP is different from that on contest and 
internal innovation.  
Another relevant literature stream is related 
to the research on RFP. In the real world, RFP is 
widely used in product procurement. The process is 
usually regarded as a multi-attribute auction in 
academy (e.g. [1] [10]). However, in our paper, we 
abstract the process into a model of price-only 
auction in which seekers set compulsory quality 
requirements for all the bidding solvers to accept. 
Based on our observation, the problems posted in 
real innovation markets are describable with the 
explicit quality requirements on solutions. 
Therefore, we believe that our price-only model 
does not reduce the explanation power of our 
results. More specifically, we assume that solvers 
compete for contract via the Vickrey second-bid 
auction in RFPs. This assumption is based on two 
facts. First, we have observed many English 
auctions in real innovation markets. Second, the 
outcome of the English auctions can be achieved 
by Vickrey auction, and it is customary to model an 
English auction as a Vickery auction [7].  
 
Model Development 
A seeker procures a problem solution from n 
solvers. All parties are risk-neutral. The value of a 
solution is determined by three variables, solvers’ 
type, solvers’ effort and a random noise. A solver’s 
type is a combination of all his/her endowed 
characteristics related to solving the problem, such 
as experience, education, intelligence, etc. A 
solver’s effort is the investment s/he puts into the 
problem, which usually refers to time and research 
resources. Besides the type and effort of solvers, all 
the other factors that influence the value of a 
solution are regarded as the random noise. 
Formally, the value of a solution Vi can be written 
as a linear function of solvers’ type βi, solvers’ 
effort return r(ei) and a random variable ξi: 
 ( ) , 1, 2, ...,          (1)i i i iV r e i nβ ξ= + +    =
  
βi is independently distributed across solvers with a 
commonly known, continuous and increasing 
cumulative density function F(βi). r(ei) is either 
linear or concave in ei. The cost of the solution is 
linear in effort with a constant unit cost c. ξi is an 
IID Gumbel random variable with mean zero and 
scale parameter μ. A higher μ means a higher 
degree of randomness. βi is private information of 
solver i; c and μ are commonly-known information.  
A contest has three stages. Firstly, a seeker 
posts a problem and announces a cash award, A, for 
the best solution. Secondly, solvers first decide how 
much effort to exert on the problem and then work 
out the solution. Finally, after all the solvers 
submitted their solutions, the seeker selects the best 
solution and pays the prize to its solver. Let V1, 
V2, …, Vn, denote the rank-ordered values of 
solutions, where V1≥V2≥…≥Vn. The profit of the 
seeker (the subscript c stands for contest) is 
1            (2)c V AΠ = −  
In a RFP, which is assumed as a Vickrey 
auction in our paper, a seeker firstly posts a 
problem and specifies the standard value, V, of the 
solution. Then, according to the value requirement, 
solvers decide how much to bid for the problem. 
The seeker will choose the lowest bidder as the 
winner and pay him the second lowest bid. A 
solver’s optimal bidding truly reveals its cost. Let 
C1, C2, …, Cn , denote the rank-ordered costs of the 
solvers, where C1≤C2≤…≤Cn. The profit of the 
seeker using a Vickrey auction (the subscript r 
stands for RFP) is 
2           (3)r V CΠ = −  
As we can see, a seeker’s profit function is 
the value of the winning solution minus the reward 
paid to the winner. Assuming the seeker pays the 
same rewards to the winners in contest and RFP 
(A=C2), we can compare the performance of the 
two mechanisms by examining the expected values 
of their winning solutions (V1 and V). For 
consistency, we denote Vc as the value of winning 
solution in contests and Vr as the value in RFP. 
 
Mechanism Comparison in Exploitive 
Innovation 
As we defined, an exploitive innovation problem 
has available technologies and the uncertainty of 
the quality of its solution lies on the characteristic 
of its solver. Assuming the value of a solution 
equals to its quality, we believe that the solution 
value in an exploitive innovation problem is only 
driven by the type and effort of solvers. Terwiesch 
and Xu (2008) define this kind of innovation as 
expertise-based projects. 
( )       (4)i i iV r eβ= +  
In a contest, for a given solver i, the 
probability for him to win the contest equals to the 
probability that the solver offers the solution with 
highest value. Let Pi (βi, F(βi), n) denotes the 
probability of the solver i offering the best solution. 
Thus, each solver solves: 
[ ( )] ( , ( ), ) ,
s.t. 0
i
i i i i i i i
e
i
Max E AP F n ceπ β π β β
π
     ≡ = −     (5)
               ≥
We assume ei is increasing with βi and r(ei)=θei, in 
which θ is defined as effort coefficient. Vi increases 
with, therefore, 
 1( , ( ), ) ( )       (6)i i i
nP F n Fβ β β−=  
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The problem of solver i can be written as 
 
( )
1 ( ) ( ), s.t. 0    (7)
i i
i i i i
e
n
iMax AF ceβ
π β β π−     = −    ≥
  
The first order condition of solver i’s problem is 
2
*
( 1) ( ) ( ) 0
( ( ))
n i
i i
i i
A n F f c
e
ββ β β
− ∂− − =∂  
which can be rearranged as  
2*( ( )) ( 1) ( ) ( )ni i i i
i
e A n F f
c
β β β
β
−∂ −=∂  
We assume βi ∈ [β0, β1]. Since Vi increases with βi, 
the solver with the lowest type has no probability to 
win and will not exert any effort in equilibrium, i.e., 
e(β0) = 0. Solving the differential equation with this 
boundary condition, we have the symmetric 
Bayesian equilibrium strategy for a solver as 
 
2 1
0
* ( 1)( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    (8)i n ni i i
A n A
e F x f x dx F
c c
β
β
β β− −−= =∫
 
Since F(β) is continuous and increasing in βi , we 
can verify that e(βi) is increasing in βi, which is 
consistent with our assumption. Substituting (8) 
into (7) yields 
1 1* ( ) [ ( )] 0     (9)n ni i i
A
AF c F
c
π β β− −= − ⋅ =  
Let β1, β2, …, βn, denote the rank-ordered types of 
the solvers, where β1≥β2≥…≥βn. Since Vi increases 
with βi, the solver whose type is βi creates the 
solution with the highest value V1: 
1 1 1 1
11
0
( )
[ ( )] ( ) ( )    (10)ni i i i i i
cV V e
e nF f d
β
β
β β
β θ β β β β−
= +
= +
=
∫
In a RFP, the expected value of submitted solutions 
is equal to the standard quality requested by the 
seeker. Therefore, the expected effort a solver will 
exert to solve the problem can be written as 
 ( )         (11)ii i
V
e
ββ θ
−=   
So, the expected cost of solver i is 
 ( )         (12)ii i i
V
C ce c
ββ θ
−= = ⋅
  
Therefore, the payment for the winner in the 
Vickrey auction, which is equal to C2 , can be 
written as 
 22         (13)
V
C c
β
θ
−= ⋅   
As we supposed before, we compare the expected 
value the seeker obtains when s/he pays the same 
reward to the winners of the two mechanisms. The 
condition can be written as 
 2A C=   
Substituting (13) into the above equation yields: 
 2        (14)r
A
V V
c
β θ= + ⋅=   
For tractability, we make a specific parametric 
distributional assumption. In the following text, we 
assume that the solvers’ types are distributed 
uniformly on [R-s, R+s], where R≥s>0. As shown 
in most statistic texts, the density of the kth order 
statistic is given by 
 
( )
1!( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
( 1)!( )!k
n k k
X
n
f x F x F x f x
k n k
− −= −− −
  
Based on this density, we can derive the expected 
value of βi. 
 
1
( ) 2
1
        (15)i
n i
R s s
n
β − += − + ⋅ +
  
Substituting (15) into (10) and (8), we have  
 
1 ( ) 22 1 1 2 1c
A n n A n
V R s s
c n n c n
θ θβ ⋅⋅ ⋅= ⋅ − + + ⋅− + −+ =
 
 
2
1
( ) 2
1r
A n A
V R s s
c n c
θ θβ ⋅ ⋅−= − + ⋅ +++ =
  
 
Proposition 1.  For a exploitive innovation 
problem, let r(ei)=θei be the solvers’ effort return 
function and consider a market with n solvers 
whose types are distributed uniformly on [R-s, R+s], 
where R≥s>0. Given the award to winner is A, and 
the unit cost of solvers’ effort is c, (a) the seeker 
can get the highest solution value, R+s+θA/c, by 
using RFP mechanism in a market with a very large 
solver pool; (b) the condition for contest 
outperforms RFP is  
 
1 1
2 0
1 2 1
A n
s
n c n
θ ⋅ −⋅ + ⋅+ − >   
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Figure 1. The Seeker’s Optimal Choice for 
Exploitive Innovation Problems 
 
Illustrated in Figure 1 is the seeker’s 
optimal choice of the procurement mechanism for 
exploitive innovation problems. As demonstrated in 
Proposition 1 and Figure 1, for certain number of 
solvers, there is a threshold level of the variance of 
solver’s type. When the variance of solver’s type is 
below the threshold, RFP will help the seeker get a 
better solution than contest does. The threshold 
increases in a growing number of the solvers 
implying that the larger the size of a solver pool, 
the more likely RFP outperforms contest. In 
addition, Figure 1 reveals that the ratio of the 
payment to winner to the unit cost of effort (A/c) 
has an effect on the seeker’s choice. If we 
normalize the unit cost to 1, the ratio equals to the 
payment amount. Thus, we may conclude that the 
more a seeker is willing to pay for a solution, the 
more likely s/he prefers RFP to contest. In addition, 
the effort coefficient (θ) has the similar effect, i.e., 
the bigger the effort coefficient, the more likely the 
seeker chooses RFP.   
Equations (7) and (8) demonstrate the 
co-existence of the advantage and the side-effect in 
contest. The advantage is that it can exploit the 
highest type value of solvers in a pool while RFP 
only gets the second highest. The side-effect is the 
underinvestment of effort due to solvers’ fear of 
sunk costs. When the advantage exceeds the 
side-effect, Contest is preferred; otherwise RFP. In 
contest, the increase in the number of solvers 
weakens the chance for a solver to win and causes 
the solver to be more cautious to invest. Thus, the 
enlargement of a solver pool will aggravate the 
side-effect of Contest. On the contrary, the increase 
of the variance of solvers’ type will enhance the 
advantage of the contest, because with a larger 
variance, the gap between the highest value and the 
second highest value is more significant. We 
conclude that both the size and the diversity of a 
solver pool will affect the performance of contest 
and, consequently, seeker’s preference to contest or 
RFP.  
As discussed, contest is superior in solver’s 
type while RFP is superior in solver’s effort and 
consequently superior in the return of the effort. 
Therefore, if the return of the effort accounts for 
the most value of the solution, RFP will probably 
outperform contest. The more to be paid for the 
solution, the larger the solvers’ effort is induced. 
Ceteris paribus, the return of the effort will have a 
larger proportion in the solution value. Meanwhile, 
the increase of the effort coefficient will also 
enlarge the proportion. Therefore, in a setting with 
large rewards and high effort coefficient, RFP 
outperforms contest. 
 
Mechanism Comparison in Exploratory 
Innovation 
In an exploratory innovation, there are huge 
technology uncertainties. To emphasize the 
technology uncertainty, we assume all the solvers 
are identical. The difference of the value of 
solutions mainly depends on the random noise 
existed in the process of technology exploration. 
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Terwiesch and Xu (2008) define this kind of 
innovation as ideation projects. 
( )i i iV r eβ ξ+= +  
In a contest, the winning probability of 
solver i is 
 
1
Pro{i wins the contest} =
( ) ( )
1 ( 1)exp
 (16)
ir e r en μ
−+ − ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
e is the effort exerted by all the other solvers except 
solver i. We assume they exert the same effort. As 
for the detailed explanation of Equation (16), we 
refer interested readers to Terwiesch and Xu (2008). 
Consequently, the profit of the solver i can be 
written as 
1
( ) ( )
1 ( 1) exp
i i
i
A ce
r e r e
n
π
μ
= ⋅ −−+ − ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Assuming symmetry e=ei and r(ei)=θlnei, we have 
the first-order condition  
2
( 1)
i
A n
e
c n
θ
μ
−=
 
The winning solution of the contest has the highest 
value of random variable, thus 
 
1
2
ln max( )
( 1)
ln ln       (17)
i icV V e
A n
n
c n
β θ ξ
θβ θ μμ
= = + +
−= + +  
As shown in the above equation, the competition 
introduced by contest produces two effects. On the 
one hand, it causes underinvestment of effort, 
which has been discussed before. On the other hand, 
it exploits the advantage of multiple solver trials 
which may produce a random value larger than the 
zero mean.  
With the strategy ei , the profit of the solver is 
 
2
1 1
i
n
A
n n
θπ μ
−= ⋅ − ⋅⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
In order to make sure that the profit of the solver is 
no less than zero, we obtain solvers’ participation 
constrain 
1
n
n
θ
μ ≤ −  
In a RFP project, since all the solvers are identical, 
the seeker can choose anyone of them to procure a 
solution of value V with a payment of 
cexp[(V-β)/θ], thus 
 ln           (18)R
A
V V
c
β θ= +=   
Proposition 2.  For an exploratory innovation 
problem, let r(ei)=θlnei be the solvers’ effort return 
function and consider a Gumbel random variable 
with mean zero and scale parameter μ. In a market 
with n solvers, (a) only when θ/μ≤n(n-1), the 
solvers will consider participating in a contest; (b) 
the condition for contest outperforms RFP is 
 
2
1 1
0
n
n n
μ
θμ
θ
−−⎛ ⎞ >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
 
 
Figure 2.  The Seeker’s Optimal Choice for 
Exploratory Innovation Problems 
 
Figure 2 shows that in an exploratory 
problem, only when the number of solvers is very 
small, seekers will prefer RFP to contest. 
Meanwhile, if the random variable has a higher 
degree of randomness, contest is more likely to 
outperform RFP. However, with the increase of the 
effort coefficient, the chance for RFP to win is 
enhanced. 
Comparing Equation (10) and (11), we find 
the advantage of a contest is that a seeker gets 
higher value of the random variable because s/he 
selects the best one from many proposals proposed 
by a group of contestants, while in a RFP a seeker 
merely accepts the result produced by one 
contracted solver. However, in this case, contest 
has the same side-effect as it has in exploitive 
problems. The solvers who participate in the 
Contests may underinvest their efforts because they 
fear of getting no reward at all. Although the size of 
solver pool has positive effect on both the 
advantage and the side-effect, it will induce more 
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advantage than side-effect when it is sized up, thus, 
the advantage will be dominant. Moreover, when 
the effort coefficient increases, the effort will 
account more for the value of the solution and 
consequently the side-effect of the contest becomes 
more influential to the solution value. Then, RFP 
will have more chances to win contest when other 
factors are fixed. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A growing number of firms have embraced the idea 
of open innovation: looking for ideas and solutions 
from the outside world. The Internet provides an 
unparalleled venue for the exchange of virtual 
knowledge products. E-market has emerged for 
firms to procure solutions for their innovation 
problems. However, these markets support different 
procurement mechanisms and hold solver pools 
with different quality and quantity characteristics. 
It is critical for firms to understand which 
procurement mechanism they should use under 
certain circumstances. 
In an exploitive innovation problem, if a 
market has a small number of diversified solvers, 
the seeker (the firm) should use a contest to exploit 
the full value of the highest solver type. On the 
contrary, if a market has a large number of similar 
solvers, the seeker should adopt RFP to obtain 
solvers’ full investment of efforts. Moreover, if the 
seeker is willing to pay a high reward to the best 
solution, s/he should choose RFP, since it can 
induce the best solution of much higher level than 
contest does. For an exploratory innovation 
problem, in most cases, a seeker should choose 
contest unless the size of the solver pool is really 
small (e.g. n<5), or the value of the solution is 
mainly determined by the effort of solvers rather 
than the random outcome of the exploratory 
process.  
Although we obtain some explicit results in 
this paper, there are more questions open to further 
research. We have observed that solvers’ profit 
varies in different procurement mechanisms. It 
causes solvers’ preference to certain mechanism. It 
will be interesting to find how this preference 
influences market structure and seekers’ behavior. 
Moreover, in exploitive innovation problems, 
seekers’ decisions on procurement mechanisms 
heavily rely on their knowledge of the distribution 
of solvers’ type. An attention is worth in how the 
information disclosure policy increases seeker’s 
knowledge on the solver’s type distribution which 
in return affects seekers’ decisions. Empirical 
research may be conducted to analyze how seekers 
choose procurement mechanisms in practice and 
which factors affect their decisions. We believe that 
the Internet-based innovation markets will play a 
significant role in open innovation, but merely a 
little of these markets has been fully explored. The 
vast grey portions on the map of the innovation 
market are left to continuous endeavoring efforts. 
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